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Abstract 
Existing research suggests that incentives to plead guilty may influence guilty and innocent 
defendants differently. This study examines that possibility through testing theoretically-
informed predictions relating to the interaction between different types of plea discount 
(sentence length and sentence type), guilt, and probability of conviction in predicting plea 
decisions, with a focus on the discounts in England and Wales. Participants (N=3,375) made 
plea decisions in vignettes that varied discount type offered, probability of conviction, and 
guilt between-subjects. Participants also answered questions about considerations that were 
important to them when making plea decisions. Results provide support for predictions, 
specifically at higher levels of probability of conviction, by showing that a discount resulting 
in a categorically different sentence type (probation rather than custody) encouraged both 
‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’ participants to plead guilty, but that a discount resulting only in a 
shorter sentence of the same type (a 1/3 reduction in sentence-length) only encouraged 
‘guilty’ participants to plead guilty. Participant reports of the considerations important to 
them when pleading suggest that the categorical discount reduced the importance of factual 
guilt or innocence in the decision-making of innocent defendants. Findings suggest that 
utilising plea discounts that vary sentences quantitatively but not categorically is important in 
maximising the extent to which plea discounts appeal to guilty but not innocent defendants.  
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Cognition and incentives in plea decisions: Categorical differences in outcomes as the 
tipping point for innocent defendants 
Accumulating psychological research has provided important insight into guilty plea 
decision-making. This research highlights the complexity of guilty plea decisions, combining 
assessments of risks and benefits that permeate risky decisions more generally with guilt and 
fairness related considerations (Helm, 2018; Redlich et al., 2017). This complexity arises in 
part because the sentence a defendant receives when pleading guilty is typically more lenient 
than the sentence they would receive if convicted at trial.  The level of penalty discount that 
should be awarded to a defendant on the basis of a guilty plea is an important policy question. 
On the one hand, discounts must be sufficient to incentivise guilty defendants to plead. When 
a defendant pleads guilty it saves public time and money and saves victims and witnesses 
from having to testify (e.g. Sentencing Council, 2017; Missouri v Frye, 2012). In fact, many 
modern criminal justice systems would not be sustainable if many defendants did not plead 
guilty (e.g. R v Caley and others, 2012; Santobello v New York, 1971).   On the other hand, 
discounts should not be so generous that they pressure innocent defendants to plead (Blume 
& Helm, 2014) or result in unduly lenient sentences for offenders (Sentencing Council, 
2011). Research can assist in this policy debate through providing insight into guilty plea 
decision-making, and specifically how incentives to plead guilty might be tailored to appeal 
to guilty but not innocent defendants.  
Existing research into guilty plea decision-making has confirmed that many of the 
factors that influence risky decision-making in problems such as the dread disease problem 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) also influence plea decisions. Potential sentences at plea and 
trial, the probability of conviction at trial, and risk preferences have all been highlighted as 
important influences on plea decisions. Generally, research suggests that defendants will 
plead guilty more when the sentence at trial is more severe or the sentence when pleading is 
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less severe (Bordens & Basset, 1985), when the probability of conviction is higher (Tor, 
Gazal-Aval & Garcia, 2010; Wilford et al., 2020), or where they have a lower preference for 
risk (Bjerk, 2007). Each of these parameters will be influenced by other key variables, for 
example the strength of the evidence against the defendant will inform estimates of the 
probability of conviction.  
The “shadow of trial” model of plea decision-making formalises these factors and the 
relationship between them to explain guilty plea decision-making. According to the model a 
defendant will compare the certain outcome from pleading guilty with the expected value of 
trial (meaning the probability of conviction at trial multiplied by the outcome if convicted at 
trial) and make a decision based on a comparison between these outcomes (Mnookin & 
Kornhauser, 1979). The model suggests that a risk-neutral defendant will plead guilty where 
their expected value of trial is worse (i.e. more severe) than the plea outcome (Bibas, 2004; 
Easterbrook, 2013; Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979). Thus, according to the model, plea 
decisions are responsive to changes in the probability of conviction and the specific outcomes 
at plea and trial. Research has provided some support for this model in predicting long-run 
average plea decisions but has also shown that it is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of 
decisions in individual cases (Bushway & Redlich, 2012; Bushway et al., 2014).  
Empirical research has also demonstrated systematic biases that are not accounted for 
by the shadow of trial model. For example, research suggests that common biases such as 
framing biases (preferring the sure option when a decision is framed as a gain and the risky 
option when a decision is framed as a loss) that influence risky decisions also influence plea 
decisions (Garnier-Dykstra & Wilson, 2019). This bias is not accounted for by the shadow of 
trial model since precise comparisons between plea and trial outcomes will be the same 
regardless of how the decision is framed. In addition, the model does not account for 
demonstrated complexity specific to plea decision-making.  
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Research has shown that plea decisions are, in at least one way, more cognitively 
complex than other risky decisions (e.g. Helm, 2018). This complexity is caused by the fact 
that plea decisions also involve consideration of factual guilt or innocence, and invoke strong 
related values (most obviously only wanting to plead guilty if you have actually committed a 
crime, see Helm & Reyna, 2017). Although defendants can be permitted to plead guilty 
without admitting guilt (e.g. through Alford pleas in some US states, see Diehm, 2015; 
Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009), research suggests that defendants are more likely to plead guilty 
when they are guilty, even when controlling for the probability of conviction (Helm & 
Reyna, 2017; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Schneider & Zottoli, 2019; Tor et al., 2010; 
Wilford et al., 2020). In adult populations, research suggests that this is driven, at least in 
part, by value-based decision-making grounded in not wanting to plead guilty (and essentially 
admit to committing) a crime that was not committed (Helm & Reyna, 2017; Tor et al., 
2010).  Innocent defendants may also be more cognitively disposed to picking the “risky” 
option of trial due to innocence placing them in more of a loss frame (Tor et al., 2010). 
Despite this, both empirical evidence (including experimental work and examination of real 
plea decisions) and legal literature suggest that innocent defendants do, under the right 
conditions, decide to plead guilty (e.g. Blume & Helm, 2014; Covey, 2013; Dervan & 
Edkins, 2013; Henderson & Levett, 2018; Wilford et al., 2020; Wynbrandt, 2016; 
Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018; Zottoli et al., 2016). Thus, while innocence influences 
defendants who are deciding whether to plead guilty and leads to a reluctance to plead guilty, 
it is not dispositive.  
Research also suggests that guilt or innocence can interact with other factors 
influencing defendant decision-making, including the probability of conviction at trial (Tor et 
al., 2010), the framing of plea decisions (Garnier Dykstra & Wilson, 2019), advocate 
recommendations (Henderson & Levett, 2018), and, in some cases, the plea discount 
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(Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; but see Dervan & Edkins, 2011; Schneider & Zottoli, 2019). 
These studies indicate the potentially complex nature of plea decisions in both guilty and 
innocent defendants, and also suggest that it may be possible to structure plea discounts to 
encourage guilty but not innocent defendants to plead. However, existing research provides 
relatively little insight into how incentives to plead might be tailored to appeal to guilty but 
not innocent defendants and, relatedly, little insight into how defendants may behave 
differently when facing relatively small differences in outcomes between plea and trial and 
when facing more categorical differences. 
In addition, to date little or no research has examined incentives to plead guilty 
outside the North American context, where generous incentives attract significant attention. 
Discounts offered to defendants who plead guilty outside of the North American context tend 
to be considered relatively modest comparatively (Roberts & Bradford, 2015; Vamos, 2009). 
Thus, it may be easy to presume that incentives will not influence innocent defendants in 
these contexts. However, the psychological complexities of plea decision-making mean that 
even seemingly modest incentives can lead to decisions being made in a way that is not 
normatively desirable from a legal perspective, most obviously when innocent defendants 
plead guilty.  
This paper draws on psychological theory, specifically Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), 
and existing research to develop and test predictions relating to the effects of different 
incentives to plead, and how such incentives are likely to interact with defendant guilt and the 
probability of conviction. These predictions are tested specifically in the context of incentives 
to plead guilty in England and Wales, and results provide specific insight into the 
appropriateness of incentives to plead currently offered in that context as well as into plea 
decision-making more generally. 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
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FTT is a dual process theory of memory and decision-making (Brainerd & Reyna 
2019; Reyna, 2012). According to FTT, when an individual encodes information (such as the 
potential outcomes as a result of plea and trial) they encode this information in two ways - as 
verbatim information (literal, veridical and detailed representations, e.g. one year of custody) 
and as gist (fuzzy, contextual, and meaning-based representations, e.g. a short period of 
custody) (Brainerd & Reyna 2019; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). When an individual makes a 
decision, they then rely more on one of these types of representation. Reliance on more 
verbatim information is associated with “verbatim processing,” which is likely to be 
superficial but precise and influenced by exact numbers and details. Reliance on more gist 
information is associated with “gist processing,” which is meaning-based and non-precise 
(Helm & Reyna, 2017). Decision-making based on gist tends to be non-compensatory, 
meaning that certain risks (e.g. risks of a categorically more negative outcome) will not be 
taken regardless of potential benefits. This effect has been demonstrated in risky decision-
making in the sexual health context, where decision-makers relying more on verbatim may be 
willing to trade risks and rewards in deciding whether to engage in unprotected sex, while 
decision-makers relying more on gist are more likely to conclude that no benefits outweigh 
the possible negative outcomes (Reyna et al., 2011). Reliance on gist can explain framing in 
risky choice problems, since options can boil down to a definite gain vs. a possible gain in the 
gain frame and a definite loss vs. a possible loss in the loss frame, leading to a preference for 
the sure option in the gain frame and the risky option in the loss frame (Reyna et al., 2014; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).  
Whether a person relies on gist or verbatim representations is determined by (a) the 
accessibility of those representations in memory (e.g. gist is more stable over time than 
verbatim representations); (b) individual differences in propensity to rely on gist or verbatim 
representations (Helm & Reyna, 2017); and (c) external factors (e.g. the specificity of 
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retrieval cues) promoting reliance on a particular type of representation (e.g. Mills et al., 
2008; Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). Understanding the external cues that push decision-makers 
towards reliance on gist or verbatim in decision-making is important since legal systems have 
control over external factors relevant to the plea decision (e.g. decision options). According 
to FTT, adults will tend to rely on the simplest level of gist necessary to make a decision. So, 
where decision options are categorically different from one another in a meaningful way, 
adults will make decisions based on these categorical differences (Reyna, 2012). Where 
categorical differences fail to discriminate options, ordinal differences (e.g. more vs. less) 
will be used where possible. Fine-grained distinctions will typically only be relied upon 
where required by a task (e.g. in a mathematical problem requiring precise calculations to 
reach an answer, or in a memory task asking decision-makers to recognise exact numbers or 
words, see Reyna & Kiernan, 1995) or where simpler distinctions do not provide a solution.   
Where qualitative values are important in decision-making, these values can create a 
meaningful distinction between options. For example, importance of the value “I would not 
want to risk death” would make an option with a risk of death and an option without that risk 
categorically different from one another in a meaningful way. Since there is a categorical 
distinction between options, individuals can rely on gist and will be likely to do so. As a 
result, they will be likely to make a decision based on this categorical distinction,  at least in 
the absence of other relevant categorical distinctions. The relationship between values and 
gist occurs because values are typically represented in long-term memory as vague gists that 
are applicable to a range of scenarios and with insufficient specificity to be applicable in 
verbatim-based decision-making (Fukura et al., 2013; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). The 
relationship can work in both directions – a person relying on gist is more likely to access and 
decide in accordance with their values, and where values are highly important in a decision-
making process, they are likely to push decision-makers more towards gist-processing.  
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The Relationship Between Innocence and Gist 
 When innocent defendants are confronted with a plea decision, strong fairness-related 
values are likely to be hugely important – most notably a desire to not plead guilty to 
something that you did not do. This desire has been shown to be important in existing work 
examining gist in guilty plea decision-making (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This importance of 
innocence is reflected in research showing the general reluctance of innocent defendants to 
plead guilty (e.g. Tor et al., 2010). This value is gist-based, will be represented categorically 
in long-term memory, and makes a simple, qualitative, distinction (factual guilt or innocence) 
central to the decision-making process. Thus, innocent decision-makers will typically have a 
categorical distinction upon which to base their decision. In the absence of other categorical 
distinctions, this distinction is likely to be determinative and decision-makers will not 
consider more fine-grained distinctions between options.  
On the other hand, those who are factually guilty will typically have accepted some 
risk of conviction and are unlikely to be driven to the same extent by visceral and fairness-
related concerns. The equivalent value in guilty defendants, wanting to admit to true 
wrongdoing, has not been shown to be such a key consideration in the literature and research 
suggests that guilty defendants are not reluctant to go to trial in the same way as innocent 
defendants are reluctant to plead guilty (e.g. Tor et al., 2010). As a result, guilty individuals 
are far less likely to have this meaningful guilt-related categorical distinction upon which to 
base their decision-making. In the absence of other categorical distinctions, guilty defendants 
will therefore have to consider more fine-grained distinctions in their decision-making and 
will be pushed towards more verbatim processing. 
Existing research provides some support for the idea that innocent defendants are 
likely to be more driven by values and guilty defendants are more likely to be driven by 
outcomes. In one study examining rationales given for accepting or rejecting hypothetical 
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plea offers, researchers found that while innocent and guilty ‘defendants’ were both generally 
driven by outcomes in decisions to accept plea offers, innocent defendants were much more 
likely than guilty defendants to be driven by value-focused rationales when rejecting plea 
offers (Schneider & Zottoli, 2019).  
Because factual guilt or innocence (a gist-based consideration) is likely to be 
important to innocent defendants, and creates a categorical distinction between decision 
options, FTT predicts that innocent defendants will be likely to rely on gist. Decisions will 
therefore be made in accordance with simple categorical distinctions. Where guilt / innocence 
is the only categorical distinction relevant this will therefore be determinative. Precise 
changes in expected value that do not influence the “gist” of options (e.g. because both 
sentences remain “short” custodial sentences) will not register in the decision-making 
process. However, where another meaningful categorical distinction is introduced, it will 
compete with factual guilt or innocence and force even innocent defendants to rely on more 
fine-grained distinctions. 
On the other hand, guilty defendants will be far less likely to see such a clear 
categorical distinction between decision options, since guilt / innocence is less important to 
them. As a result, in the absence of another categorical distinction, there will be no 
meaningful categorical distinction to rely on and guilty defendants will be pushed towards 
more fine-grained distinctions and more verbatim processing.  
Therefore, innocent defendants should make plea decisions in predictably different 
ways from guilty defendants. For innocent defendants, innocence will drive decision-making 
in the absence of other categorical distinctions, meaning that categorical but not purely 
quantitative distinctions between plea and trial will encourage guilty pleas. For guilty 
defendants, guilt will not drive decision-making in the absence of other categorical 
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distinctions, meaning that both categorical and quantitative incentives to plead will encourage 
guilty pleas.  
Existing research provides some support for the prediction that innocent defendants 
are more likely to be reliant on gist-based processing (Tor et al., 2010). This research shows 
that in hypothetical vignettes when plea and trial options have an equal expected value 
(meaning the plea option is equivalent to the outcome if convicted at trial multiplied by the 
probability of conviction), “guilty” defendant’s preferences do not change much based on the 
probability of conviction at trial. This finding would be expected if decisions were 
determined by precise expected value calculations, and risk preferences. On the other hand, 
“innocent” defendants given the same problems showed changes in decision-making despite 
absolute expected values remaining constant. Specifically, innocent defendants were less 
likely to plead when the probability of conviction was lower and more likely to plead when 
the probability of conviction was higher – suggesting an influence of factual innocence in 
addition to expected value (i.e. a general reluctance to plead until the probability of 
conviction became high). 
Therefore, according to FTT, offering quantitative incentives to plead guilty but not 
incentives that change decision options from a categorical perspective has the potential to 
encourage guilty but not innocent defendants to plead guilty.  
More Quantitative and More Categorical Incentives in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, approximately two-thirds of defendants accused of serious 
crimes (crimes tried in the Crown Court rather than the Magistrates Court) plead guilty 
(Ministry of Justice, 2020, p9). Considering all crimes prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution 
Service, around 90% of convictions are obtained via guilty plea (Nobles & Schiff, 2019). The 
sentence for a criminal offence is set by a judge following conviction, in line with prescribed 
sentencing guidelines. Specific sentencing guidelines outline the discounts that can be made 
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to a sentence on the basis that a defendant entered a guilty plea rather than being convicted at 
full trial (Sentencing Council, 2017). This guideline notes that where a defendant pleads 
guilty at the earliest opportunity a sentence reduction of one-third should be made (subject to 
certain exceptions) (Section D1). This reduction decreases the further along in proceedings a 
plea is entered (Section D2). Importantly, the reduction can result in imposing a different 
“type” of sentence, for example by reducing a custodial sentence to a community sentence, or 
by reducing a community sentence to a fine (Section E1). Whether a different type of 
sentence is awarded is at the discretion of the sentencing judge. A different type of sentence 
would typically be awarded in borderline cases where a 1/3 reduction could be taken into 
account in this way rather than through reducing sentence length. The guidelines specifically 
note that where a court has imposed a different type of sentence there “should normally” be 
no further reduction on account of the guilty plea (although a further reduction may be 
justified based on other factors) (Section E1). As a result, where a sentence type discount is 
awarded, a sentence length discount will not normally be given on the basis of the guilty plea. 
Thus, the system in England and Wales provides a good example of incentives that 
can be considered more quantitative (1/3 changes in length to a sentence) and more 
categorical or qualitative (changes in the type of sentence). The 1/3 change in sentence length 
is unlikely to alter the overall meaning of the plea options (since it is likely insufficient to 
change the more categorical classification of outcomes, for example as a “long” or “short” 
period in custody) but would change the strength of the deal in a more quantitative, expected 
value type analysis. However, the change in sentence type is likely to alter the plea decision 
in both more quantitative ways (e.g. because more days of freedom are lost as the result of 
custody) and more categorical ways. A different sentence type has a qualitatively as well as a 
quantitatively different effect on a person’s life (see Helm & Reyna, 2017) and will change 
the “gist” of plea options. For example, it could change a risk of custody to the definite 
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avoidance of custody (a categorical distinction). The importance of the categorical difference 
generated by a change in sentence type can be seen by looking at the different values or 
principles that might become evoked in the decision-making process when a change in 
sentence type is offered. For example, where a person would need to risk custody by going to 
trial but not by pleading guilty a value like “I would never risk going to prison” or “I would 
never risk being taken away from my family” may become engaged in the decision-making 
process. Note that these types of values are unlikely to be evoked in a case involving a 1/3 
sentence reduction only, where both plea and trial would involve prison and being away from 
family. It is unlikely that absent additional complicating factors someone would feel, for 
example, that they could accept two years away from family but could never risk three.     
In the case of innocent defendants, thought to be relying more on gist, where a 1/3 
sentence length reduction is offered, this will not alter the decision-making process, since gist 
remains the same. In such cases, the gist of the plea option is pleading guilty when innocent 
and receiving a certain “gist” sentence and the gist of the trial option is not pleading guilty 
when innocent, and risking the same “gist” sentence. This pushes the defendant towards trial 
(since not pleading guilty when innocent and receiving a possible penalty is better than 
pleading guilty when innocent and receiving a certain penalty). As a result, it is likely that 
even when a 1/3 sentence reduction is offered, innocent defendants will continue to go to 
trial. On the other hand, where an incentive is offered that changes the meaning of options, a 
new gist is introduced that might encourage the defendant towards a guilty plea. For example, 
where a custodial sentence is risked at trial but can be avoided by pleading, a value of not 
wanting to risk custody will begin to compete with the value of not wanting to plead guilty 
when innocent. In the case of guilty defendants, thought to be relying more on verbatim, both 
the 1/3 sentence reduction and sentence type reduction have the potential to influence the 
decision by influencing the precise risks and rewards involved in the decision.  
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Predictions  
Based on previous work, and consistent with FTT, it is expected that people who are 
‘guilty’ will plead guilty more often than those who are innocent (e.g. Tor et al., 2010; Helm 
& Reyna, 2017). This study also tests a number of predictions specific to FTT.   
1. People who are guilty will be influenced by both more categorical and more 
quantitative incentives, even where these incentives are relatively modest. They will 
therefore be responsive to a 1/3 sentence-length reduction and a sentence-type 
reduction.   
This prediction is based on the FTT-informed expectation that guilty defendants will not have 
a clear categorical driver in plea decisions (absent a categorical distinction introduced by the 
plea discount) and therefore decisions will be influenced by the introduction of a categorical 
discount (which will create a categorical distinction to be relied upon), or, where such a 
discount is not present, by more fine-grained distinctions between decision options such as 
differences in expected value (which will influence decisions in the absence of categorical 
distinctions).  
2. People who are innocent will only be encouraged to plead guilty when a categorically 
more lenient sentence (i.e. a different type of sentence) is given when pleading guilty 
compared to trial. 
This prediction is based on the FTT-informed expectation that innocent defendants will tend 
to have a categorical distinction central to their decision-making (pleading guilty when 
innocent vs. not pleading guilty when innocent) due to important relevant values. Thus, 
innocent defendants will be likely to rely on gist and will be driven by this categorical 
distinction in the absence of a categorical distinction to compete with it.  
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3. A categorical difference between plea and trial will introduce a gist that competes with 
not wanting to plead guilty when innocent that will make factual innocence less 
important in decision-making. 
This prediction is based on the FTT-informed expectation that changing decision options in 
categorical ways (such as altering the charges involved in a plea decision, see Helm & Reyna, 
2017) will influence the gist relied on in plea decisions, and thus ultimate decisions.  
METHODS 
Participants 
Participants were 3,375 adults recruited from the Prolific platform.1 This sample size 
included approximately 70 participants in each experimental condition in the study (35 
participants who received a less detailed community service description, and 35 participants 
who received a more detailed community service description). This sample size was chosen to 
ensure assumptions of analysis methods used would be satisfied, and to roughly match sample 
size in previous work using FTT and applying similar paradigms (e.g. Helm & Reyna, 2017).   
Participants completed the study online and participation took an average of between 
three and four minutes. All participants completed a Captcha verification prior to completing 
the study and received a small monetary incentive upon completion. Participants ranged in age 
from 19 to 83 (M = 36.04, SD = 13.27). All participants were British. Eighty-seven percent 
identified as White, 5.4% identified as Asian, 3.5% identified as Black, and the remainder 
identified as another racial group. This distribution is broadly representative of the racial 
distribution in the UK, where the most recent census results listed 86% of the population as 
White, 7.5% of the population as Asian, and 3.3% of the population as Black (Office for 
National Statistics, 2011).  Approximately 34% of participants identified as male, 66% 
 
1 Post hoc analyses confirm 1 – β > 80% for detecting an odds ratio of 1.3 (small; Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010) 
or an effect size f of .1 (small; Cohen, 1988). Analyses conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). 
COGNITION AND INCENTIVES IN PLEA DECISIONS 16 
identified as female, and the remainder identified as another gender group (e.g. gender fluid). 
This distribution was more weighted towards females than the UK population as a whole is. 
The most recent census described the population as approximately 51% female, and 
approximately 49% are male (Office for National Statistics, 2011).  Analyses described below 
were conducted controlling for gender, and significant results remained the same.  
Design Overview 
Participants made decisions in hypothetical plea vignettes. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 48 experimental cells produced by a 2 Guilt (Innocent vs. Guilty) x 4 
Discount (9-year custodial sentence reduced to 6-year custodial sentence, 3-year custodial 
sentence reduced to 2-year custodial sentence, 3-year custodial sentence reduced to 2-year 
community sentence, and 1-year custodial sentence reduced to 1-year community sentence) x 
6 Probability of Conviction (30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%). Half of the participants also 
answered questions about the values that were most important to them when making their 
decision. More information on the design and how conditions were chosen is provided below.  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were presented with a hypothetical plea vignette in which they were told 
they had been accused of theft and had to make a decision about whether to plead guilty to the 
theft or go to trial. Theft was chosen due to the varying degrees of theft allowing realistic 
manipulations of sentence length, and to avoid as far as possible confounding from decisions 
being driven by social stigma (as they may be, for example, in cases involving sexual offences).  
Participants were randomly assigned to a guilt condition (they were either told they did 
commit the theft that they were accused of, or they did not commit the theft they were accused 
of) and a probability condition (there was said to be either a 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, or 
80% probability of conviction at trial). This range of probabilities was included in order to vary 
the strength of deals participants were offered from an expected value standpoint, and to 
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capture potential changes in gist relied upon.  If a principle such as “I would not plead guilty 
when innocent” is governing a decision then probability of conviction will be unlikely to have 
an effect on decision-making. On the other hand, if a principle such as “I would not want to 
risk custody” is governing a decision then decision-makers may plead more as the risk of 
custody becomes greater (i.e. as the probability of conviction increases).  
Participants were also randomly assigned to one of the following four sentence discount 
conditions, designed to mirror possibilities under the sentencing guidelines in England and 
Wales: 
1. Nine years of custody if convicted at trial and six years of custody if convicted via plea 
(referred to as the SentenceLength9v6 condition).  
2. Three years of custody if convicted at trial and two years of custody if convicted via 
plea (referred to as the SentenceLength3v2 condition).  
3. Three years of custody if convicted at trial and two years of community service if 
convicted via plea (referred to as the SentenceLength+Type condition). 
4. One year of custody if convicted at trial and one year of community service if convicted 
via plea (referred to as the SentenceType condition).   
Conditions were designed to be controlled experimentally, while also representing realistic 
scenarios in the England and Wales context. The SentenceLength9v6 and SentenceLength3v2 
conditions were both included despite both involving only sentence length in order to ensure 
results were driven by the proportion of the discount (1/3) not changing the gist of the sentence 
(e.g. from long to short) rather than being driven by the absolute length of the discount (3 years 
and 1 year respectively).  The decision in condition 3 is unlikely to occur in practice due to 
sentencing guidelines encouraging judges not to award a sentence length discount where a 
“type” discount is given (Sentencing Council, 2017). However, the condition was included to 
provide a comparison to condition 2. The number of years of sentence associated with each 
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option remain the same in both conditions (3 v 2), but in condition 3 the reduced sentence 
length is also combined with a change in sentence type. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
distinctions between conditions.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Participants were given a brief description of community service. Half of the 
participants were simply told that this would mean they would not go to prison but that 
restrictions would be placed on their movements. The other half received the same description, 
but were also given examples of such restrictions, specifically needing to engage in community 
work or to be home by a set time in the evenings.2  This description was added half way through 
the study to address a concern that participants may not have an understanding of what 
‘restrictions on movement’ would mean. The level of detail included about community service 
was included as a factor in the primary regression analysis but was not significant and did not 
influence the significance of other variables.  
After making their plea decisions, a subset of participants (n=1624) also answered 
questions about considerations when pleading (the other sub-set answered different questions 
following the plea decision, involving how participants perceived plea and trial, which are not 
analysed for the purposes of this study). Specifically, participants were asked what was most 
important to them when deciding whether to plead guilty: whether they committed the crime 
or not, the need to avoid custody, or another consideration. Participants were able to select one 
or multiple options.  
RESULTS 
 
2 This resulted in approximately 35 participants in each condition receiving each of the community service 
descriptions.  
COGNITION AND INCENTIVES IN PLEA DECISIONS 19 
Plea Decisions  
Overall, participants pled guilty in 34.3% of cases and chose to go to trial in 65.7% of 
cases. Guilty defendants pled guilty more often than innocent defendants (13.1% of innocent 
defendants pled guilty compared to 55.7% of guilty defendants, χ2 = 679.04, p <.001). This 
finding confirmed expectations based on FTT and existing work, and suggested that the 
manipulation of guilt / innocence was effective.  
A linear regression analysis was used to analyse data, due to research suggesting that a 
general linear model with an identity link rather than a logit link function is generally the best 
strategy to estimate causal effects of treatments on binary outcomes (Gomila, 2020), 
particularly in models including a number of interaction terms.  A regression was preferred to 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) since treating probability of conviction as a continuous 
variable made results easier to interpret. However, a supplementary ANOVA was also 
conducted. Results were very similar, and are reported in the Supplemental Materials.  
The regression analysis included Probability of Conviction (30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 
70%, 80%), Guilt (0=innocent, 1=guilty), Discount (SentenceLength9v6, SentenceLength3v2, 
SentenceLength+type, Sentencetype), and all interactions between those variables.  The 
discount variable was dummy coded into three variables comparing the Sentence Length 9v6 
Discount condition to each of the other levels of Discount, as detailed in Table 2.  The 
dependent variable was Plea Decision (0=plea, 1=trial). The results of the regression are 
reported in Table 2. Removing the three-way interaction terms from the model reduced the 
overall model fit (to R = .539, R2 = .290, Adjusted R2 = .288, SE = .40), so all interaction terms 
remained in the model.  
Follow-up analyses were conducted to explore the nature of the three-way interactions 
among Guilt, Probability, and 9v6 / Length + Type comparison, and among Guilt, 
Probability, and 9v6 / Type comparison (which moderate all other significant effects). 
COGNITION AND INCENTIVES IN PLEA DECISIONS 20 
Relationships between Guilt, Probability, and Discount are displayed in Figure 1 to assist in 
the interpretation of results. 
Linear regression analyses were conducted separately for each Discount level, and 
included Guilt, Probability, and the interaction between Guilt and Probability as predictors. 
These results showed an interaction between Guilt and Probability in the Sentence Length 
conditions, although note that this interaction just missed two-tailed significance in the 
SentenceLength3v2 condition (SentenceLength9v6: B=-.063, SE = .015, β = -.311, t=-4.353, 
p <.001; SentenceLength3v2: B=-.027, SE = .016, β = -.134, t=-1.714, p =.087). Follow-up 
analyses in each of these conditions showed that the relationship between Probability and 
Plea Decision (pleading guilty more as the probability of conviction increased) was stronger 
in the guilty condition than in the innocent condition (SentenceLength9v6 Guilty, B=-.08, SE 
= .01, β = -.26, t=-5.5, p <.001, Not Guilty B=-.01, SE = .01, β = -.10, t=-2.07, p =.040; 
SentenceLength3v2 Guilty,  B=-.05, SE = .01, β = -.26, t=-5.52, p =.001, Not Guilty B=-.02, 
SE = .01, β = -.17, t=-3.36, p =.001). This interaction was not significant in the two 
conditions including a sentence-type discount (p =.912 and p = .860, respectively), meaning 
that the influence of probability of conviction on plea decision was not significantly different 
based on guilt in the two conditions where a sentence ‘type’ distinction was present.  
Values Analyses 
 The values participants rated as most important to them when making their plea 
decision were assessed to test prediction 2, that a categorical difference between plea and trial 
will introduce a gist that competes with not wanting to plead guilty when innocent, that will 
make factual innocence less important in decision-making. 
Overall, 75.9% of participants said that whether they were guilty or not was the most 
important, or one of the most important, considerations for them when deciding whether to 
plead guilty. Thirty percent of participants said that the need to avoid custody was the most 
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important, or one of the most important, considerations for them when deciding whether to 
plead guilty. In the values analyses, unlike in the decision analyses reported above, Probability 
was not significant and did not significantly interact with other variables. For this reason, 
ANOVA results were most easily interpretable and an ANOVA was used for primary analyses. 
The importance of being guilty or not.  
First, analyses examined when participants rated whether they were guilty or not as the 
most important, or one of the most important, considerations in making their plea decision. A 
univariate ANOVA was conducted, with whether being guilty or not was rated as the most 
important, or one of the most important, considerations in the decision (1) or not (0) as the 
dependent variable, and Guilt, Probability of Conviction, and Discount as predictors.  
Results revealed three significant effects. First, a significant main effect of Guilt 
(F(1,1536)=75.823, p<.001, ηp2 = .047) and a main effect of  Discount (F(3,1536)=4.995, 
p=.002, ηp2 = .010). Finally, a significant interaction between Guilt and Discount 
(F(3,1536)=4.361, p=.005, ηp2 = .008), which is displayed in Figure 2. For participants in the 
guilty condition, whether they were guilty was the most important, or one of the most 
important, considerations for approximately the same proportion of participants across the 
Discount conditions. For participants in the innocent condition, whether they were guilty or 
not was the most important, or one of the most important, considerations to significantly less 
participants in the two sentence type conditions, when compared to the two sentence length 
only conditions.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
The risk of custody 
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Second, analyses examined when participants rated the need to avoid custody as the 
most important, or one of the most important, considerations in making their plea decision. A 
univariate ANOVA was conducted, with whether the need to avoid custody was the most 
important or one of the most important considerations in the decision (1) or not (0) as the 
dependent variable, and Guilt, Probability of Conviction, and Discount as predictors.  
Results revealed two significant effects. First, a main effect of Guilt 
(F(1,1536)=25.608, p<.001, ηp2 = .016) such that participants in the guilty condition were more 
likely to rate needing to avoid custody as the most important, or one of the most important, 
considerations to them when making their plea decisions (Mguilty = .360, SE = .016, Minnocent = 
.244, SE =  .016).  
Second, results revealed a main effect of Discount (F(3,1536)=17.415, p<.001, ηp2 = 
.033). Unsurprisingly this consideration was rated as the most important, or one of the most 
important, considerations to participants in the two conditions in which it was possible to 
definitively avoid custody (Length+Type and SentenceType) significantly more than it was in 
the SentenceLength discount conditions (Msentencelength9v6 = .205, SE = .022, Msentencelength3v2 = 
.238, SE = .024 [p=.307], Mlength+type =  .400,  SE = .023 [ps<.001], MSentenceType =  .369, SE = 
.023 [p<.001, p<.001, p=.315]).   
DISCUSSION 
Key Findings  
The results of this study support previous research suggesting that factual guilt is 
likely to influence plea decisions, but also that under the right conditions innocent defendants 
will plead guilty (e.g. Helm & Reyna, 2017; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Tor et al., 2010). 
Results also provide support for FTT-based predictions that while purely quantitative 
incentives to plead are likely to appeal only to guilty defendants, more categorical, 
qualitative, incentives to plead are likely to appeal to both guilty and innocent defendants. 
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Participants in the innocent condition in this study showed significant resistance to pleading 
guilty when the more quantitative incentive was offered even at high levels of probability of 
conviction. However, when a categorical incentive was offered (the change in sentence from 
custody to community service), they showed a similar trend to guilty defendants in terms of 
pleading guilty more as the probability of conviction increased (note that this relationship 
was also significant when the quantitative incentive was offered but was weaker in innocent 
defendants than in guilty defendants). An analysis of values showed that where this 
categorical incentive was offered the value of not wanting to plead guilty when innocent 
became less important, and the value of wanting to avoid custody became more important. 
Thus, results suggest categorical differences have the potential to lead innocent defendants to 
plead and to reduce the importance of factual guilt and innocence in their decision-making 
process. The more quantitative incentive did not have this effect, although guilty defendants 
did appear responsive to this incentive – pleading guilty at relatively high rates when the 
probability of conviction was high.   
Limitations 
These findings should be interpreted in light of a number of important limitations. First, 
the study used a nested rather than fully factorial design. This design was chosen to maximise 
ecological validity (by using real incentives that might be faced by defendants in England and 
Wales). Caution should be taken when extrapolating the findings to other contexts or incentives 
(including to the US plea-bargaining system, as discussed below). However, the findings are 
supported by theoretically founded predictions, and thus would be expected to replicate in 
circumstances where the same theoretical considerations apply (i.e. a comparison between a 
more quantitative and more qualitative incentive).  
The participants in the study were not making real plea decisions and their decisions 
were considerably simpler than those made in practice. This simplicity was reflected in the 
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short time taken to make decisions in the study. In practice, an array of other considerations 
may be important to real defendants and influence their decisions, for example pressure from 
lawyers or the legal system (which has been shown to be important) (Baldwin & McConville, 
1977; Henderson & Levett, 2019; Henderson & Shteynberg, 2020), remand in custody (Edkins 
& Dervan, 2018; Peterson, 2020), or informal charge discounts awarded (Helm, 2019). In 
practice even in the structured system in England and Wales, defendants can be faced with 
other incentives to plead. For example, defendants may also be incentivised to plead where the 
prosecutor agrees to drop or reduce charges if a plea is entered, or where they can gain informal 
benefits by pleading guilty, such as release from custody or lower costs (for more information 
see Baldwin & McConville, 1977; Helm, 2019). In addition, the vignettes presented to 
participants in this study were highly simplified in order to ensure participant understanding. 
This simplification was necessary experimentally but meant that in important ways vignettes 
differed from real decisions. For example, in real decisions defendants risking a custodial 
sentence would also consider the fact that they would be unlikely to serve the duration of their 
sentence in custody, and would likely be released early. The community service description 
given to participants in this study was also quite general, and future work should test 
predictions with more strenuous and specific requirements of community service to ensure 
generalisability for different defendants. 
Therefore, this experimental research forms only part of the evidence that should be 
considered in evaluating guilty plea policy. However, it is an important and necessary part. The 
research was able to use a controlled experimental design that allowed close measurement of 
the effects of experimental manipulations and minimized confounding. While it is true that 
people may make decisions differently in an experimental study than they would in practice, 
emerging research on guilty pleas suggests that field work and experimental work are likely to 
converge on important findings (e.g. relating to children pleading guilty when innocent; Helm 
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et al., 2018a and Zottoli et al., 2016, and innocent defendants pleading guilty; Covey 2013 and 
Tor et al., 2010) and can support one another. Experimental research can therefore provide 
important insight in planning and interpreting field work and illuminating potential causal 
mechanisms for observed phenomena. Currently examining guilty pleas from innocent 
defendants is hard in practice due to the difficulty determining factual guilt or innocence, 
particularly in systems where appealing a conviction via plea is often difficult (e.g. Blume & 
Helm, 2014; Nobles & Schiff, 2019).  However, this work might be drawn on in order to design 
instruments for interviews with defendants, and could bolster the reliability of findings relying 
on self-reported guilt or innocence. In addition, it should be noted that if anything the fact 
participants did not actually have to experience custody might have been expected to reduce 
the effects of our manipulations (since people may be more willing to risk custody in a vignette 
than in reality), meaning that effects could even be stronger in practice.  
Ultimately, the findings in this study are unlikely to reflect magnitudes that would be 
expected in real cases, but still capture an important part of the cognition underlying plea 
decision-making. There is also a strong argument to suggest that the system should not be 
offering defendants incentives that members of the public (such as the participants here) would 
expect to encourage innocent people to plead guilty.  
Implications for Policy 
The findings in this paper contribute to the policy debate in England and Wales 
concerning whether pleading guilty should influence the “type” of sentence that a defendant 
receives. While current Sentencing Guidelines allow for a different type of sentence to be 
imposed where a defendant pleads guilty compared to what would be imposed at trial, this is 
not uncontroversial (e.g. Roberts & Harris, 2017; Helm, 2018). The research reported in this 
paper suggests that allowing a guilty plea to influence sentence type might be leading innocent 
defendants to plead guilty and undermining the role of guilt or innocence in their decision-
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making process, thus undermining important normative goals of the criminal justice system. 
On the other hand, the research suggests that the current 1/3 sentence length discount may well 
be appropriate in encouraging guilty but not innocent defendants to plead guilty, and so 
supports the retention of this discount. The importance of ensuring appropriate discounts when 
defendants plead guilty can be seen in the recent Post Office Scandal, almost all of the sub-
post masters and mistresses acquitted of false accounting and theft charges by the Court of 
Appeal had initially pleaded guilty to charges against them (Hamilton & Others v Post Office 
Limited, 2021). Following their acquittal, some of the successful appellants stated that they 
had pled guilty to avoid the risk of custody (e.g. Ashworth, 2021).  
 In addition, results suggest that defendant autonomy may be undermined where 
sentence type discounts are introduced, since considerations stemming from those discounts 
may undermine a desire to maintain innocence, even in innocent defendants. Thus, such 
discounts undermine the ability of an individual who has not committed a crime to act in 
accordance with their core goals and values by contesting guilt at trial (for more information 
on this concept of autonomy, see Bratman, 2007; Dworkin, 1994).  This paper therefore 
provides important support for retaining the 1/3 sentence length discount in England and Wales 
but removing the ability of this discount to change sentence type imposed. 
The findings from this paper can also influence the regulation of incentives to plead 
guilty in other jurisdictions. However, findings do not necessarily directly generalize to 
systems that differ significantly from the system in England and Wales, such as the United 
States plea-bargaining system. In that context, discounts are largely determined by individual 
prosecutors rather than judges and are much more varied. Sentence-length reductions are often 
of more than a third of sentence and are therefore much more likely to categorically change 
decision options for defendants (e.g. from a long custodial sentence to a short custodial 
sentence). As a result, sentence discounts may not be so distinguishable from the “type” 
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discounts studied in this paper, and may similarly lead innocent defendants to systematically 
plead guilty. This suggestion should be explored in research examining the US system directly.  
If confirmed, and if such discounts are still retained, their appeal to innocent defendants should 
be recognised and justified. Some legal literature does suggest that innocent defendants 
pleading guilty may not be problematic because innocent defendants are convicted at trial too 
and should be able to benefit from plea reductions, since they face the possibility of conviction 
and a harsher penalty at trial (Garrett, 2016). If it is acknowledged that incentives to plead are 
systematically appealing to the innocent, this should be recognised through an appeals system 
that does not make it unduly difficult for defendants to appeal following a guilty plea (e.g. 
Blume & Helm, 2014).   
Implications for Research 
These findings may also provide useful context for plea researchers more generally 
examining the relationship between guilt and the probability of conviction at trial. For example, 
some studies suggest that innocent defendants are influenced by the probability of conviction, 
potentially even more than guilty defendants where the baseline position of guilty defendants 
is to plead guilty (e.g. Wilford et al., 2020; Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018). However, these 
studies have provided choices in which plea outcomes differ categorically from outcomes if 
convicted at trial (lab work vs. a charge of academic dishonesty, and a long vs. short period of 
custody respectively in the studies cited). This research suggests that the probability of 
conviction may influence innocent defendants far less when outcomes that do not differ 
categorically are offered (e.g. two short periods of lab work, or two short periods of custody, 
differing in specific magnitudes). Future research should build on the work in this paper, and 
specifically examine other more quantitative reductions (e.g. reductions in the length of a 
community sentence) and other more categorical reductions (e.g. reductions from a community 
sentence to a fine) in order to extend the generalizability of results. Future research should also 
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examine other factors likely to influence plea decisions in practice and interact with findings 
of this work. Such factors should include factor that might be race (since research suggests that 
in practice those in different racial groups might be making plea decisions differently; e.g. 
Hood, 1992), gender (which influence decisions in a way not captured by this study), and 
attorney influence (which has been shown to be important; e.g. Henderson & Shteynberg, 
2020). Future research should also test the predictions of this study in a population who have 
really made plea decisions, to ensure that results replicate among the people who actually need 
to make plea decisions in practice.  
Empirical research has the potential to ensure that convictions obtained via plea are 
normatively acceptable in practice, most notably through maximising accuracy of convictions 
via plea. This paper provides an important contribution to such research by showing that 
ensuring gist-equivalence in plea and trial options so far as possible is important in ensuring 
respect for the presumption of innocence, the accuracy of convictions, and the autonomy of 
those making plea decisions.  
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TABLES 




Reduction in sentence 
length Reduction in sentence type 
SentenceLength9v6 3 years 3 years (1/3 of sentence) No 
SentenceLength3v2 1 year 1 year (1/3 of sentence) No 
SentenceLength+Type 3 years 1 year (1/3 of sentence) Yes 
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Table 2  
Multiple Regression Predicting Plea Decision 
Variable B SE β t 
Probability of 
Conviction 
-.01 .01 -.05 -1.16 
Guilt -.14 .06 -.15 -2.35* 
Offer Dummy 1 .03 .06 .03 .54 
Offer Dummy 2 -.08 .06 .07 -1.25 




.06 .02 -.28 -4.01* 
Offer Dummy 1 
x Guilt 
-.12 .089 -.08 -1.38 
Offer Dummy 2 
x Guilt 
-.35 .090 -.24 -4.03* 
Offer Dummy 3 
x Guilt 
-.39 .09 -.28 -4.43* 
Offer Dummy 1 
x Probability of 
Conviction 
-.01 .02 -.03 -.51 
Offer Dummy 2 
x Probability of 
Conviction 
-.03 .02 -.13 -2.23 
Offer Dummy 3 
x Probability of 
Conviction 




Offer Dummy 1 




Offer Dummy 2 




Offer Dummy 3 
.07 .02 .18 2.91* 
Note. Plea Decision: 0=Plea, 1=Trial; Guilt: 0=Innocent, 1=Guilty; Probability 30%, 40%, 
50%, 60%, 70%, 80%; Offer Dummy 1: SentenceLength9v6 = 0, SentenceLength3v2 = 1, 
SentenceLength+Type = 0, SentenceType=0; Offer Dummy 2: SentenceLength9v6 = 0, 
SentenceLength3v2 = 0, SentenceLength+Type = 1, SentenceType=0; Offer Dummy 3: 
SentenceLength9v6 = 0, SentenceLength3v2 = 0, SentenceLength+Type = 0, 
SentenceType=1. 
Regression model summary: R = .541, R2 = .293, Adjusted R2 = .290, SE = .40. *p<.05. 
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Figure 2: Significant interaction between guilt and discount type in predicting whether being guilty or not was the 
most important or one of the most important considerations in the participant’s plea decision. Error bars +/- 1 




































































































Predictor variables in the ANOVA were guilt (innocent, guilty), probability of 
conviction (30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%), and discount type (SentenceLength9v6, 
SentenceLength3v2, SentenceLength+Type, SentenceType). The dependent variable was 
decision to plead guilty (0) or go to trial (1). 
 The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt (F(1,3327) = 974.324, p<.001, 
ηp2 = .227) such that participants in the guilty condition pled guilty more often than participants 
in the innocent condition (Mguilty = .435, SE = .010, Minnocent = .870, SE = .010). The ANOVA 
revealed a significant three-way interaction among guilt, probability, and offer type 
(F(15,3327) = 1.726, p=.040, ηp2 = .008). To summarise, in the sentence length only conditions, 
only guilty participants pled guilty more at higher levels of probability of conviction (with 
innocent participants choosing trial regardless of the probability of conviction), but in the 
sentence type conditions, innocent participants and guilty participants showed a similar trend 
of pleading guilty more as probability of conviction increased. Detailed results are presented 
below. 
Follow-up comparisons indicate significant main effects of probability for guilty 
participants in all sentence discount conditions, except for the SentenceType discount condition 
in which this effect just missed two-tailed significance (SentenceLength9v6 F(5,3433)=9.642, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .014; SentenceLength3v2 F(5,3433)=4.046, p=.001, ηp2 = .006; 
SentenceLength+Type F(5,3433)=4.749, p<.001, ηp2 = .007; SentenceType F(5,3433)=1.999, 
p=.076, ηp2 = .003). In contrast, there was no significant effect of probability for innocent 
participants in the two sentence length conditions (p=.871 and p = .523 respectively). As with 
guilty participants, in the SentenceLength+Type condition there was a significant effect of 
probability (F(5,3433)=5.160, p<.001, ηp2 = .007) and in the SentenceType condition the effect 
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just missed two-tailed significance (F(5,3433)=2.107, p=.062, ηp2 = .003). Pairwise 
comparisons are displayed in Table s1. 
Other significant results are listed below for completeness. First, analyses revealed 
significant main effects of probability (F(5,3327) = 18.496, p<.001, ηp2 = .027), and discount 
type (F(3,3327) = 95.240, p<.001, ηp2 = .079). Participants pled guilty significantly more often 
when there was an 80% probability of conviction at trial than in any of the other conditions 
(M80 = .540, SE = .017; M70 = .600, SE = .017, p=.014; M60 = .647, SE = .016, p <.001; M50 = 
.661, SE =.017, p<.001; M40 = .705, SE = .017, p<.001; M30 = .754, SE = .017, p<.001), and 
participants pled guilty more often when there was a 70% probability of conviction at trial than 
when there was a 60%, 50%, 40%, or 30% probability of conviction (p=.049, p = .010, p <.001, 
p<.001 respectively). When there was a 60% probability of conviction participants pled guilty 
significantly more often than when there was a 40% or 30% probability of conviction (p=.012, 
p<.001 respectively) but there was no significant difference in plea rates at the 60% and 50% 
probabilities of conviction (p=.525). In the 50% condition, participants pled guilty significantly 
more often than in the 30% condition (p<.001) but plea rates did not differ from the 40% 
condition (p=.065). Plea rates in the 40% condition were significantly higher than those in the 
30% condition (p=.036).   
The significant main effect of discount type showed that participants pled guilty least 
often when they were offered a sentence length discount only (in the SentenceLength9v6 and 
SentenceLength3v2 conditions, M = .764, SE = .014 and M = .777, SE = .014 respectively). 
These two conditions were not significantly different from each other (p=.527) but showed 
significantly lower plea rates than the SentenceLength+Type condition (M = .505, SE = .014, 
ps <.001) and the SentenceType condition (M = .571, SE = .014, ps <.001). Participants also 
pled guilty significantly more often in the SentenceLength+Type than in the SentenceType 
condition (p=.001).  
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Results also revealed a significant interaction between discount and guilt (F(3,327) = 
9.383, p<.001, ηp2 = .008). Participants in both guilt conditions pled guilty roughly equally 
often in the two SentenceLength conditions (Guilty: MSentenceLength9v6 = .580, SE = .019, 
MSentenceLength3v2 = .597, SE = .019, p = .520; Innocent: MSentenceLength9v6 = .946, SE = .019, 
MSentenceLength3v2 = .950, SE = .020, p = .869). Also in both conditions, plea rates were 
significantly higher in the SentenceLength conditions than in the SentenceLength+Type 
(Guilty: Mlength+type = .260, SE = .020, ps<.001; Innocent Mlength+type = .742, SE = .019, ps<.001) 
and SentenceType conditions (Guilty: Msentencetype  = .304, SE = .019, ps<.001; Innocent 
Msentencetype = .831, SE = .020, ps<.001). In the innocent condition only, participants pled guilty 
more often in the SentenceType condition than in the SentenceLength+Type condition 
(p=.001). This difference was not significant in the guilty condition (p=.119).  
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Table S1: Pairwise comparisons of rates of going to trial by probability for guilty and 
innocent defendants in each offer condition.  
 
Offer Condition Guilt Probability with 
significantly higher trial 
rate / probabilities with 
significantly lower trial 
rate  
p 
Length9v6  Guilty 30 / 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 .013, <.001, 
<.001, <.001, 
<.001 
  40 / 70, 80 .006, <.001 
  50 / 80 .022 
  Innocent No significant 
differences 
 
Length3v2 Guilty 30 / 70, 80 .011, <.001. 
  40 / 80 .004 
  50 / 70, 80 .043, .001. 
  60 / 80 .013 
 Innocent No significant 
differences 
 
Length+Type Guilty 30 / 50, 70, 80 .001, .001, 
<.001 
  40 / 50, 80 .010, .006 
  40 / 70 .011 
  50 / 60 .043 
  60 / 70 .043 
  60 / 80 .047 
 Innocent 30 / 60, 70, 80 .005, .006, 
<.001 
  40 / 80 .007 
  50 / 60, 70, 80 .019, .024, 
<.001 
Type Guilty 30/ 80 .023 
  40 / 80 .009 
  50 / 80 .017 
 Innocent 30 / 80 .019 
  40 / 80 .009 
  
 
 
